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OCC v. Providian National Bank: Enforcement of the FTC's
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Statute by the OCC

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 28, 2000, Providian National Bank (Providian),'
one of the nation's largest credit card issuers, settled charges of
unfair and deceptive trade practices brought by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)2 under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act).' The OCC alleged that Providian
misled customers in the marketing of its bank credit cards.4 Under
the terms of the settlement, Providian agreed to pay at least $300
million to consumers allegedly harmed by the bank's actions.5
According to Daniel P. Stipano, director of the OCC's
enforcement and compliance division, that amount, which is still
under negotiation,6 could increase if necessary to make harmed
customers whole
In its complaint, the OCC alleged that
1. Providian National Bank, based in Tilton, NH, is held by Providian Financial
Corporation, which is headquartered in San Francisco, CA. ProvidianNationalBank
Settles OCC Charges of Unfair and Deceptive Credit Card Practices,69 LAW WEEK
2022 (July 11, 2000) [hereinafter Providian National Bank Settles]. Providian has
more than $26 billion of assets under its management. Laura Mandaro & Scott
Silvestri, ProvidianExpected To Pay $300 Million in PredatorProbe, AM. BANKER,
June 21, 2000, at 2.
2. Statement of John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency (June 28,
2000) (on file with N.C. BANKING INST.) [hereinafter Hawke Statement].
3. A copy of the consent order is available from the OCC. The agreement came
in the form of a cease-and-desist order reached under 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
ProvidianNationalBank Settles, supra note 1, at 2022. In addition to the settlement
with the OCC, Providian entered into a settlement agreement with the San Francisco
district attorney's office and the California attorney general's office. Id.
4. Hawke Statement, supra note 2.
5. Id. In addition to the approximately $300 million under the terms of the
settlement with the OCC, Providian agreed to pay $5.5 million in civil fines to settle
the charges brought by the San Francisco district attorney and the California attorney
general for violation of California state laws. ProvidianNationalBank Settles, supra
note 1, at 2022.
6. Hawke Statement, supra note 2. See also Providian National Bank Settles,
supra note 1, at 2022.
7. ProvidianNationalBank Settles, supra note 1, at 2022.
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Providian engaged in "predatory" behavior by misleading its
customers when marketing its credit cards.' According to Mr.
Stipano, "the OCC believes that Providian has engaged in a
pattern of abusing consumers by misleading them into accepting
various credit card-related products that they do not want and in
many cases do not need." 9
The settlement is significant on two levels. First, the
estimated $300 million settlement amount is, according to the
OCC, the largest monetary award ever brokered by a bank
regulatory agency."
Second, and more significantly, the case
marks the first time that a federal bank regulatory agency has
brought an unfair and deceptive trade practices action against a
bank under the FTC Act." Section 5 of the FTC Act, on which the
OCC's cause of action was based, bars unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 2 Banking law experts, however, are divided over
whether OCC enforcement of the FTC Act is within the agency's
statutorily authorized powers. 3 The OCC acknowledges that the
move was groundbreaking, but insists that its action was well
within its enforcement scope.14 OCC Chief Counsel Julie L.
Williams claims the OCC has "the authority to take cease-and'5
desist actions with respect to laws that relate to bank operations.'
Other industry lawyers, however, argue that because the Federal
Reserve Board has never written regulations authorizing agency
8. Mandaro & Silvestri, supra note 1, at 2.
9. Providian National Bank Settles, supra note 1, at 2022. In addition to its
settlement with the OCC and the authories in California, Providian reached
settlements in class action suits on December 28, 2000 from actions proceeding in the
California Superior Court in San Francisco and the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. R. Christian Bruce, Credit Cards: Providian
Reaches Settlement Pact on Suits ChallengingCardPractices,76 Banking Rep. (BNA)
32, 32-3 (Jan. 8, 2001). The plaintiffs alleged that Providian had violated consumer
protection laws through the bank's credit card program. Id. at 33. The estimated
total value of the settlements is $105 million. Id. at 32.
10. ProvidianNationalBank Settles, supra note 1.
11. Michele Heller, Lawyers on OCC vs. Providian: We Object, AM. BANKER,
July 10, 2000, at 4.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
13. Heller, supra note 11, at 4.
14. Id.
15. Id.; 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1994). This subsection provides that "the
appropriate Federal banking agency" may issue cease-and-desist orders against banks
for violation of "a law, rule, or regulation." Id.
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enforcement of the unfair and deceptive trade practices section
16
under the FTC Act, the 0CC cannot legally enforce that law.
This Note discusses the Providiansettlement and analyzes
its implications. After providing background on the Providian
case in Section 1I,17 the Note will discuss the judicial history of the
enforcement of the FTC Act in Section 111.18 It will then discuss, in
Section IV, the issue of whether the OCC has the statutory
authority to enforce the FTC Act against banks, a question left
open by the settlement.' 9 Finally, this Note will consider, in
Section V, the possible benefits and consequences of OCC
enforcement actions against banks for unfair and deceptive trade
practices."
II. BACKGROUND

The OCC's 2' primary functions are to charter, regulate, and

16. Heller, supra note 11, at 4.
17. See infra notes 21-46 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 47-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 74-136 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 137-159 and accompanying text.
21. The OCC was established by the National Currency Act of 1863 as a bureau
of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. About the OCC,at http.www.occ.treas.gov/
AboutOCC.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2001) [hereinafter About the OCC]. The
National Bank Act later re-enacted the power of the OCC as administrator of the
national banking system. Id. That act authorized the OCC to hire a staff to supervise
and examine national banks. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 12 C.F.R. §
4.2 (2000). The agency currently supervises and regulates more than 2,600 national
banks, which hold approximately fifty-eight percent of the total assets of all U.S.
commercial banks. About the OCC, supra. The agency is headed by the
Comptroller, who is appointed for a five-year term by the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Comptroller of the Currency, 12 C.F.R. § 4.3 (2000). In
addition to managing the OCC, the Comptroller also serves as a director of the
Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and as a director of the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation. About the OCC, supra. The OCC is
headquartered in Washington, D.C., where the agency directs OCC policy, supervises
OCC operations, and directly supervises certain national banks, including the largest
national banks by the agency's Multinational Banking Department. Washington
Office, 12 C.F.R. § 4.4 (2000). The agency has six domestic district offices and an
office in London to supervise the international activities of national banks. District
and Field Offices, 12 C.F.R. § 4.5 (2000). The OCC is funded by assessments on
national banks, which pay for their examinations by the OCC and for the OCC's
processing of their corporate applications. About the OCC, supra. The OCC also
receives investment income from U.S. Treasury securities. Id.
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supervise national banks.22 The Agency also has the power to take
various forms of supervisory action against banks that do not
comply with laws and regulations, or who otherwise engage in
unsound banking practices.23 Specifically, the OCC can issue civil
monetary penalties, remove officers and directors, negotiate
agreements to change banking practices, and issue cease-anddesist orders against national banks.24
In the Providiancase, the OCC claimed the bank engaged
in numerous objectionable practices.2 ' The Agency alleged that
Providian used telemarketers to encourage consumers to transfer
their credit card accounts to Providian by promising a lower
interest rate than the consumer was currently paying. 6 The
telemarketers, however, would allegedly refuse to disclose exactly
how much the savings would be.
Even in cases where the
customer persisted in asking specifically how much lower the rates
would be, the OCC claimed that the telemarketers refused to
provide the requested information.2 ' According to the Agency,
22. 12 C.F.R. § 4.2. The OCC states that its mission is "to ensure a stable and
competitive national banking system." About the OCC,supra note 21. It lists four
objectives on which its activities are predicated: (1) to ensure the soundness and
safety of the national banking system; (2) to foster competition between national
banks by allowing banks to offer new services and products; (3) to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of OCC supervision, including reducing regulatory
burden; (4) to ensure, for all Americans, fair and equal access to financial services.
Id.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
24. Id.
25. Fact Sheet, Comptroller of the Currency, June 28,2000, at 1 (on file with N.C.
BANKING INST.) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
26. Id. at 1-2. The telemarketers who marketed this program were instructed to
use terms like "great savings" and "maximum savings." Id. at 1.
27. Id. Telemarketers were instructed to refuse to answer questions about the
specific amount of savings. Id. Rather than answering such questions with specific
numbers, the telemarketers used scripts that directed them to respond:
What we will do is beat what you are currently paying in interest.
Basically, just show us the regular, non-introductory rates you're
paying for the balances you've transferred, and we'll combine this
information to get the actual cost you're paying in interest - and
beat it! So, you'll have a lower overall rate!
Id.
28. Id. In instances where the consumer persisted in asking about the specifics of
the savings, telemarketers were instructed to say, "[y]ou are in control.. .that is why
this account can really save you money! Because your long-term rate is determined
by the information you send us showing the regular non-introductory rates you're
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Providian did offer savings in some cases, but only in amounts
ranging from 0.3% to 0.7% rate reductions. 9
The OCC alleged that where customers agreed to transfer
their accounts to Providian, the bank required the consumer to
provide proof of the rate they were paying to their former credit
card issuer.30 The OCC claimed that in cases where the bank was
not satisfied with a customer's proof of their old rate within the
specified ninety-day period, Providian charged the customer the
highest rate allowed under the credit agreement, which was
21.99% in some cases. 31 The Agency also alleged that in cases
where customers failed to prove their former credit card interest
rate to the Providian's satisfaction, the bank, by written policy,
would wait until the seventieth day to inform the customer.32 This
delay, according to the OCC, diminished the consumer's
opportunity to successfully prove the prior interest rate to
Providian.33 Additionally, the OCC alleged that after a consumer's
account was initially transferred to Providian, the bank required
an additional fee for funds to be moved to another bank.34
The OCC also alleged that Providian telemarketers left out
key disclosures when it marketed its credit protection program.
Under this program, customers paid $156 annually for this
coverage and, according to the OCC, were told that their monthly
currently paying on the balances you transfer." Id. If pressed again by the consumer,
under our Guaranteed
the telemarketer was directed to respond: "[w]ell, Mr./s __,
Saving Program, what we do is determine the true cost of what you are paying in
interest and we beat it. That's why we've had such an overwhelming response to this
account." Id. If pressed further, the script instructed the telemarketers to say:
"[s]imply show us the regular, non-introductory rates you're paying for the balances
you've transferred and we'll combine this information to get the actual cost you're
paying in interest - and beat it! So, you have a variable rate that beats what you are
paying now! (Sounds good, doesn't it!)" Id. at 1-2.
29. Id at 2. The OCC claimed the telemarketers were instructed by Providian not

to tell consumers that the maximum savings over the consumer's current rate was
0.7% in one rollout and 0.3% in another rollout, regardless of how persistently the
consumer pressed the matter. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 2.
Fact Sheet, supra note 25, at 2.
Id.
Id.

34. Id. Providian's "balance transfer fee" charged to move funds to another
institution was 3% of the customer's account balance. Id.
35. Id. Providian marketed the credit protection program as a way to avoid
having to make payments when unable to work or unemployed. Id.
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balance credit card payments would be waived for up to eighteen
months in the event of an accident, sickness, disability,
hospitalization, or involuntary unemployment.36
The OCC
charged, however, that Providian failed to "adequately disclose"
that the program's benefits were only valid during months for
which customers paid fees for the protection.3 1 The OCC also
claimed that customers were not adequately advised that benefits
for involuntary unemployment were not applicable until three
months of fees were paid to Providian Additionally, the Agency
charged that Providian failed to adequately inform consumers that
the benefits did not apply to customers who are self-employed.39
The Agency also claimed that Providian engaged in
objectionable marketing practices with respect to its "no annual
fee" cards. 40
According to the OCC, Providian failed to
adequately inform its customers that credit protection coverage (at
an annual cost of $156) was mandatory for "no annual fee" cards.4'
In cases where customers complained about unexpected credit
protection charges, bank representatives would inform them that
the only alternative to paying for the credit protection was to pay
36. Id. at 2-3. Under the terms of the program, participating customers were
charged no interest during that period, and no adverse credit reports were to be filed
against the customer. Id. at 2.
37. Fact Sheet, supra note 25, at 2. The credit protection was limited to the
months the customer paid for the coverage, even when less than the eighteen months
touted by Providian's telemarketers. Id.
38. Id. The credit protection program was also unavailable for cases of
hospitalization, sickness or disability caused by a pre-existing condition unless the
consumer had paid six months of premiums. Providian failed to disclose this
restriction as well. Id.
39. Id. Additionally, the OCC alleged that Providian failed to disclose that credit
protection could be denied to applicants in the following situations: if the consumer
accessed credit from another credit card other than Providian's card; if the consumer
paid more than the minimum payment to another credit card account, besides
Providian's; if the consumer's account was not current; and if the consumer's account
was over-limit. Id. at 2-3.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. In marketing its "no annual fee" cards, Providian did not adequately
disclose that, although technically no annual fee was charged, consumers were
required to subscribe to the bank's credit protection program at a rate of $156 per
year. Id. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The fact that credit
protection was mandatory for the "no annual fee" card was not disclosed on either
the solicitation letters marketing the product or on the card's application form.
Rather, Providian indicated that credit protection coverage was included with the
card. Fact Sheet, supra note 25, at 3.
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an annual fee.42 The credit protection coverage fees were more
expensive than the annual fees.43 Thus, according to the OCC, "in
order for the consumer to receive a card with no annual fee, the
44
consumer had to pay for even more expensive credit protection."
The OCC also alleged that Providian left out key
disclosures when it marketed its "Real Check" program, an awards
program for new Providian customers. 45 The Agency claimed that
Providian failed to disclose adequately that consumers were not
only required to transfer an outstanding credit card balance to
Providian, but they also needed to transfer a certain minimum
balance in order to get the full reward.46
III. JUDICIAL HISTORY OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE FTC ACT
The OCC claimed that these and other practices related to
the marketing and issuance of credit cards by Providian
constituted unfair and deceptive trade practices under the FTC
Act.47 Section 5 of the Act prohibits "unfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce. ' 48 In 1964, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) issued a policy statement that clarified
this provision by articulating a three-prong test for determining
whether a practice is unfair or deceptive. 49 This three-prong test
considers 1) whether a practice causes substantial injury to
consumers, 2) violates established public policy, or 3) is immoral,

42. Fact Sheet, supra note 25, at 3.

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.

In one instance, the promised rewards were up to $100; in another

instance, they were up to $200. Id.
46. Id. For example, in order to receive a $200 reward, subscribing customers

were required to transfer a minimum balance of $10,000. Id.
47. ProvidianNational Bank Settles, supra note 1, at 2022.

48. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45
(1994).

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) provides in pertinent part, "Unfair methods of

competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Id.
49. Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408, Unfair or
Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards
of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt.

408).
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unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous ° The FTC's test was
approved by the Supreme Court in Federal Trade Commission v.
51
Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
According to the FTC, consumer injury is substantial when
the harm involves monetary damage, is neither speculative nor
trivial, the injury is not outweighed by the competitive benefits of
the practice, and is not reasonably avoided by the consumer.5 2 The
FTC has explained that the public policy prong is often used in
unfair and deceptive trade practices cases as additional evidence to
determine the extent of consumer injury. 3 The FTC has also
stated that violation of an established public policy, in some
circumstances, may be sufficient to validate agency action.54 The
unethical or unscrupulous conduct prong of the test has, since the
Sperry & Hutchinson decision, been deemed duplicative. As the
FTC explained, "conduct that is truly unethical or unscrupulous
will almost always injure consumers or violate public policy as
well.

, 56

The Providiancase is not the first time a dispute has arisen
over enforcement of the FTC Act's unfair and deceptive trade
practices provision. 7 Due to the Act's broad definition of
procedures deemed to be unfair or deceptive trade practices,
litigants quickly began asserting private, federal causes of action
50. Id.
51. 405 U.S. 233,244 (1972).
52. United Companies Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200
(D.Mass. 1998). See also Letter from the Federal Trade Commission to the
Honorable Wendell H. Ford and the Honorable John C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980),
reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 98-156, Pt. 1, at 34 (1983) [hereinafter FTC Letter].
53. United Companies LendingCorp., 20 F. Supp. at 201. See also FTC Letter,
supra note 52 at 38-40.
54. United Companies LendingCorp., 20 F. Supp. at 201. See also Credit
Practices Rule: Statement of Basis and Purpose and Regulatory Analysis, 49 Fed.
Reg. 7740,7743 (Mar. 1, 1984) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 444).
55. United Companies LendingCorp., 20 F. Supp. at 201. See also American
Financial Services Assn. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
FTC Letter, supra note 52, at 40.
56. United Companies LendingCorp., 20 F. Supp. at 201. Courts have noted that
proof of actual deception is not required to establish a violation of the unfair and
deceptive trade practices provision on the FTC Act. Misrepresentations are
considered prohibited by the Act if they "possess a tendency to deceive." Trans
World Accounts, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 594 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1979).
See also MacKenzie v. U. S., 423 U.S. 827 (1975).
57. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
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after the original adoption of the FTC Act in 1914.58 Courts,
however, have consistently rejected such claims.5 9 Citing the
Supreme Court, one district court, for example, stated that "it is
well-settled that there is no private, federal claim for which this
court can grant relief for violations of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.,

60

Despite the limitation on private enforcement under the

federal statute, many states make private causes of action available
to injured parties under their unfair and deceptive trade practices
North Carolina, for example, has adopted the
provisions.

substantive portions of the federal statute verbatim, 61 but permits a
private cause of action for unfair and deceptive trade practices. 2
Other states provide a private cause of action as well, some

expressly by statute, 63 and others by core interpretation where the
statutory language is silent on the question. 4
Prior to the Providiancase, and in light of the inability of
individuals to file private causes of action based on the federal
statute,65 the FTC Act's unfair and deceptive trade practices
provision has been enforced against banks through the consumer
complaint procedure.66 Under this procedure, any consumer
having a complaint about a State member bank 67 can submit the
58. Summey v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 449 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D. S.C. 1976).
59. Moore, 270 U.S. at 597. See also Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S.
290 (1976); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson
v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973).
60. Summey, 449 F.Supp. at 135 (citing Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,
270 U.S. 593, 597 (1926)).
61. North Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, N.C. GEN STAT. § 75-1.1 (1997).
Section 75-1.1(a) states: "unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce,
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful." Id.
62. ITCO Corp. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 47 (4th Cir. 1983). See also
Atlantic Purchasers, Inc. v. Aircraft Sales, Inc., 705 F.2d 712, 715 (4th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that NCUTPA confers a private right of action).
63. 815 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(a) (West 1993). The Illinois unfair and

deceptive trade practices act provides that a private cause of action rests with "any
person who suffers damage as a result of a violation of this Act committed by any
other person." Id.
64. Browell v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 757 F.Supp. 526, 531 (M.D. Pa. 1991).
65. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
66. 12 C.F.R. § 227.2 (2000).
67. For purposes of the consumer complaint procedure, "State member bank" is
defined as "a bank that is chartered by a State and is a member of the Federal
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complaint to the Federal Reserve System. 8 The Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which has authority to
take enforcement action over State member banks,69 refers
complaints involving national banks to the OCC to enforce
compliance.70 Any individual or group filing a complaint alleging
unfair or deceptive trade practices should receive a substantive
response within fifteen days.71 In cases where the OCC finds a
national bank is engaging in unsafe or unsound practices, it may
issue a cease-and-desist order against that bank.72 If the offending
bank fails to comply with such an order, the OCC can seek
enforcement of the order through the courts.73
IV. DOES THE OCC HAVE TrE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE
THE FTC AcT BY BRINGING AN ACTION?
The Providian case marks the first time the OCC has
sought to enforce the FTC Act by bringing an action against a
bank for unfair and deceptive trade practices.74 The FrC Act
declares that unfair or deceptive acts or practices affecting
commerce are unlawful.75 The provision of the Act listing those
entities subject to enforcement, however, explicitly excludes banks
and some other financial institutions from the FTC's scope of
76
enforcement.

Reserve System." 12 C.F.R. § 227.1(c).
68. 12 C.F.R. § 227.2(a).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 227.11(c)(2). The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System also has authority over "branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than
federal branches, federal agencies, and insured state branches of foreign banks),
commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and
organizations operating under § 25 or § 25A of the Federal Reserve Act." Id.
70. 12 C.F.R. § 227.11(c)(1). This section gives enforcement authority to the
OCC over "national banks, banks operating under the code of law for the District of
Columbia, and federal branches and federal agencies of foreign banks." Id.
71. 12 C.F.R. § 227.2(b).
The individual or group may receive an
acknowledgement setting a reasonable time for a substantive response, rather than a
substantive response in some cases. Id.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1994).
73. Id. § 1818(i)(1).
74. Heller, supra note 11, at 4.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994). This provision reads in full: "[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." Id.
76. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994). This provision reads in full:
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No provision for enforcement against banks existed until

the 1975 addition of § 57a to the FTC Act.7 7 This section addresses
agency enforcement against unfair and deceptive trade practice
violations committed by various financial institutions, including
banks." First, § 57a provides that the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System "shall prescribe regulations" in order to
prevent unfair and deceptive trade practices with respect to banks,
defining with specificity such practices and containing
requirements prescribed for the purpose of their prevention.7
Second, § 57a grants the OCC the power to enforce compliance
with these regulations against national banks pursuant to § 8 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDIA). ° This section explicitly

The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent
persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, savings and
loan institutions described in section 18(f)(3) [15 U.S.C. §
57a(f)(3)], Federal credit unions described in section 18(f)(4) [15
U.S.C. § 57a(f)(4)], common carriers subject to the Acts to
regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to
[the Federal Aviation Act of 1958], and persons, partnerships, or
corporations insofar as they are subject to the Packers and
Stockyards Act, 1921, as amended [7 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq.], except
as provided in section 406(b) of said Act [7 U.S.C. § 227(b)], from
using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.
Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1994).
78. Id. § 57a(f). This subsection applies to "banks, savings and loan institutions,
or Federal credit unions." Id.
79. Id. § 57a(f)(1). This paragraph specifies that the appropriate regulatory
agency "shall prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of this section, including
regulations defining with specificity such unfair or deceptive acts or practices, and
containing requirements prescribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or
practices." Id. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has the authority to prescribe
regulations with respect to savings and loan institutions; and the National Credit
Union Administration Board has the authority to prescribe such regulations with
respect to Federal credit unions. Id. This paragraph states that the regulatory
agencies specified in this subsection "shall establish a separate division of consumer
affairs which shall receive and take appropriate action upon complaints with respect
to such acts or practices by banks or savings and loan institutions" subject to its
jurisdiction. Id.
80. Id. § 57a(f)(2). The portion of this paragraph relating to national banks states
that:
[c]ompliance with regulations prescribed under this subsection
shall be enforced under section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act [12 U.S.C. § 1818], in the case of national banks, banks

384
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empowers the OCC to enforce regulations promulgated by the
Federal Reserve Board only; it does not, by its plain language,
grant the OCC authority to enforce violations of the FTC Act not
encompassed by such regulations. 8
In only one instance has the Federal Reserve Board
enacted the type of unfair and deceptive trade practice regulations
Congress instructed it to prescribe in § 57a.82 Regulation AA's
Credit Practices Rule prohibits a narrowly defined list of activities
deemed to be unfair and deceptive trade practices."
The
regulation prohibits consumer credit contracts that include
provisions that apply confessions of judgment, waivers of
exemption, and certain assignments of wages and security interests
in household goods to the agreement.84
Regulation AA
operating under the code of law for the District of Colombia, and
Federal branches and Federal agencies of foreign banks, by the
division of consumer affairs established by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency.
Id. The division of consumer affairs of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System has the authority to enforce the regulations
prescribed under this subsection against State banks that are members of
the Federal Reserve System, branches and agencies of foreign banks (other
than Federal branches, Federal agencies, and insured State branches of
foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by
foreign banks, and organizations operating under 25 or 25(a) [25A] of the
Federal Reserve Act [12 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. or §§ 601]. Id. § 57a(f)(2)(B).
The division of consumer affairs of the FDIC has the authority to enforce
the regulations prescribed under this subsection against non-member State
banks and insured State branches of foreign banks. Id. § 57a(f)(2)(C).
81. Id. § 57a(f).
82. 12 C.F.R. § 227.11 (2000).
83. Id. §§ 227.11-15. The consumer complaint procedure for alleged violations of
this regulation are outlined in 12 C.F.R. §§ 227.1-2. For a discussion of the consumer
complaint procedure under Regulation AA, see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying
text.
84. 12 C.F.R. § 227.13. This subsection states that "(i)t is an unfair act or practice
for a bank to enter into a consumer credit obligation that contains, or to enforce in a
consumer credit obligation purchased by the bank, any of the following provisions"
(a) a confession of judgment, warrant of attorney, or other waiver of the right of the
opportunity to be heard in the event of suit; (b) a waiver of exemption or other
process on real or personal property held, owned by, or due to the consumer, unless
the waiver applies solely to property subject to a security interest in connection with
the obligation; (c) an assignment of earnings, unless its terms allow revocation at the
will of the debtor, it is a payment plan authorized by the consumer as a method of
making payments which commences at the time of the transaction, or it applies only
to earnings already earned at the time of the assignment; or (d) a nonpossessory
security interest in household goods other than a purchase money security interest.
Id.
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additionally prohibits specified practices involving cosigners to
credit contracts 85 and one specific form of late charge arising from
a credit relationship. 6 Consistent with § 57a,87 Regulation AA
grants the authority to enforce compliance to the OCC in the case
of national banks.88
The OCC's allegations against Providian are based on
violations of the FTC Act, 89 but do not fit within the narrow
parameters of activities prohibited by Regulation AA." The
statutory language of the FTC Act explicitly authorizes the OCC
to enforce the Act with regard to practices covered by regulations
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board.9 ' What is less clear is
whether the OCC can enforce compliance with the FTC Act92
beyond the parameters of these regulations. The OCC derives its
enforcement authority from the FDIA 93 Section 1818 of the
FDIA affords the OCC a wide range of enforcement options
against national banks, including cease-and-desist orders,94
85. Id. § 227.14. This section prohibits, in connection with the extension of credit
to consumers, a bank from misrepresenting the nature or extent of cosigner liability,
and obligating a cosigner unless the cosigner is informed prior to becoming obligated
of the nature of the liability. Id. § 227.14(a). This section also requires that the bank
provide a written "clear and conspicuous disclosure statement" to the cosigner
separate from any other part of the agreement prior to the cosigner incurring
obligation. Id. § 227.14(b). The disclosure statement must be substantially similar to
the sample statement provided in the regulation. Id.
86. Id. § 227.15. This section prohibits a bank from collecting "any delinquency
charge on a payment, when the only delinquency is attributable to late fees or
delinquency charges assessed on earlier installments, and the payment is otherwise a
full payment for the applicable period and is paid on its due date or within an
applicable grace period." 12 C.F.R. § 227.15(a) (2000).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
88. 12 C.F.R. § 227.11(c)(1) (2000). The OCC has the authority to enforce
compliance with Regulation AA "in the case of national banks, banks operating
under the code of laws for the District of Columbia, and federal branches and federal
agencies of foreign banks." Id.
89. See Fact Sheet, supra note 25. For a summary of the allegations against
Providian, see supra notes 25-46 and accompanying text.
90. 12 C.F.R. §§ 227.13-15. For a discussion of the acts and practices prohibited
by Regulation AA, see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(2) (1994). For a discussion of the Federal Reserve's Board
duty to promulgate regulations applying to banks and the OCC's authority to enforce
such regulations, see supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
94. Id. § 1818(b)(1). The number of cease-and-desist orders issued by the OCC
against banks has been steadily on the rise. Special Supervision/Fraud and
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removal of directors, 95 and the power to require the offending
bank to make restitution or provide reimbursement for losses
caused by the inappropriate activity.96 This Act does not limit the
OCC's enforcement authority to practices covered by
regulations. 97 The FDIA gives the OCC the power to prosecute
violations of "law, rule or regulation."9 8 This language supports
the Agency's position that its authority under the FDIA expressly
allows it to take action for any violation of law.99 According to this
reasoning, the OCC has the authority to enforce any provision of
the FTC Act declaring a trade practice unlawful, even if it is not
included in a regulation promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board.'
The language in the FTC Act itself, however, indicates that
a violation of the Act's unfair and deceptive trade practice
provision is not enough to give the agency enforcement
jurisdiction.'0 ' A literal interpretation of the Act's language
supports the position that the OCC's jurisdiction with regard to
unfair and deceptive trade practices is limited to those acts
prohibited specifically by regulation.02 The OCC's action against
Providian, therefore, brings forth an apparent conflict over
enforcement jurisdiction between the FTC Act0 3 and the FDIA.' ° '
Because neither statute resolves the apparent conflict 0 5
Enforcement Activities, OCC QUARTERLY

JOURNAL, Sept. 2000, at 22. In 1999, the
OCC issued eleven cease-and-desist orders against banks. Id. The agency issued

eight, five, and two cease-and-desist orders against banks in the years 1998, 1997, and
1996, respectively. Id. Five such orders were issued during the first two quarters of
2000. Id.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e)(1)(C)(ii).
96. Id. § 1818(b)(6)(A).

97. See Id. § 1818(b)(1).
98. Id.
99. Heller, supra note 11, at 4.
100. See id. See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
101. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994). For a discussion of the exclusion of banks
from the FTC Act enforcement provision, see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying

text.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1994).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 45; 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f). For a discussion of the applicability of the
FTC Act, see supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994). For a discussion of the applicability of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, see supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 54; 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f); 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
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and no other statute addresses the point, the question is whether
the OCC may proceed with its cause of action when no rules
governing the enforcement of the statute expressly permit it to do
so. Thus, the question is one of statutory interpretation in the first
instance. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, which
was handed down by the Supreme Court in 1984, is the landmark
case regarding agency interpretation of legislation." 6 The Chevron
court established a two-part test that courts must employ when
10 7
substantively reviewing administrative interpretation of statutes.
First, the reviewing court will ask "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue."' 1 8 In cases where the
intent of Congress is clear from the statutory language, agencies
and reviewing courts "must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."' 0 9 Thus, in cases where Congress
speaks directly to the point, the analysis ends there." If, however,
"the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue," the reviewing court proceeds to the
second step of the test and asks "whether the agency's answer is
The Court
based on a permissible construction of the statute."'
a
gap
for the
left
has
explicitly
in Chevron held that "if Congress
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the
agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
1' 12
regulation."
Applying the Chevron holding to the Providian case, the
statutory language in both the FTC Act 3 and the FDIA1 14 must be
considered. Both Acts address the issue of OCC enforcement
against banks.'15 Section 5(a)(2) of the FTC Act explicitly
excludes banks from enforcement by the Federal Trade

106. 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227 (1984).
107. Id. at 842.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 843.

110. Id. at 842.
111. Id. at 843.
112. Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1227

(1984).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1994).
114. 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(2); 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1).
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Commission.16
However, § 18(f) of the FTC Act grants
enforcement authority to the OCC against banks." 7 Yet, that
power is limited to the enforcement of regulations prescribed by
the Federal Reserve Board.'18 The FDIA, on the contrary, grants
broad enforcement authority to the OCC over national banks for
violation of "a law, rule, or regulation."" 9 No additional language
in the FTC Act, the FDIA,or any additional statute resolves the
ambiguity created by the conflict between the two Acts.' 0 In cases
where Congress has not spoken clearly on the question, Chevron
directs reviewing courts to give deference to the agency's
interpretation.'
Since the Chevron decision, however, some debate has
arisen over the degree of deference given to the agency in cases
where the agency's jurisdiction is at issue.'
In a post-Chevron
dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan argued that Chevron does not
apply if "the statute is designed to confine the scope of the
agency's jurisdiction to the areas Congress intended it to
occupy." ' Justice Scalia responded by insisting that "it is settled
law that the rule of deference applies even to an agency's
12 4
interpretation of its own statutory authority or jurisdiction.',
Post-Chevron rulings by the Supreme Court support Justice
Scalia's view, even in cases where an agency interprets its enabling
legislation to expand the agency's jurisdiction.'25 Justice White,
citing Chevron for a unanimous Court, held that when addressing
"a problem of defining the bounds of [an agency's] regulatory
authority," the Court's review is limited to the question of whether

116. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).

117. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(2).
118. Id. § 57a(f)(1).

119. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f) (1994); 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1994).
121. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984).
122. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354
(1988).
123. Id. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 381 (Scalia, J., concurring).
125. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845-86 (1986).
See also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); U.S.
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
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126
the agency's interpretation is reasonable.
The Chevron court noted that in order to sustain an
agency's interpretation of a statute, a court need not conclude that
the agency's construction was the only one it could have adopted
or even that it is the interpretation the court would have reached if
the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding. 127 Donald
T. Hornstein, an administrative law expert, notes that Congress's
intent, based on the conflicting applicable statutes in this case, is
unclear."2 Deference, therefore, should be given to the OCC's
construction.'29
Lawyers in the field recognize that the result of a challenge
to the OCC's action in this case is uncertain. Molly A. Meegan of
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom in Washington, D.C.
acknowledges this uncertainty, noting that she "would not have
been surprised had a judge said the OCC did not have the
30
jurisdiction" to enforce the FTC Act as attempted in Providian1
Recognizing that there is "a reasonable chance that the
outcome could have gone either way" had the OCC's position
been challenged, Eugene M. Katz of Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge
& Rice in Charlotte, a former litigation attorney for the OCC,
states that it was a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction for
3
the OCC to order the bank to cease and desist a violation of law.1 '

In reaching his conclusion, Mr. Katz acknowledges the tension
between the substantive and jurisdictional statutory provisions
involved.1 12 Mr. Katz believes that, due to inaction by the Federal
Reserve Board in passing regulations, the OCC likely believed it
was justified in taking an aggressive stance in order to enforce a
126. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 131-32.

127. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 11
(1984).
128. Interview with Donald Thomas Hornstein, Reef Ivey II Research Professor

of Law, School of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, in Chapel Hill,
N.C. (Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Hornstein interview].
129. Id.
130. Interview with Molly A. Meegan, a senior litigator in the consumer financial

services enforcement and litigation practice at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom, L.L.P., in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 4,2001) [hereinafter Meegan interview].

131. Interview with Eugene Katz, Member, Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice,
PLLC, in Charlotte, N.C. (Jan. 4,2001) [hereinafter Katz interview].
132. Id.
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substantive provision on the FTC Act.133 He notes that the
Agency's action in this case could be compared to the OCC
ordering a bank to cease and desist violation of tax codes, even
though the Internal Revenue Service has primary jurisdiction over
tax law enforcement.13 ' Despite the lack of explicit jurisdictional
enforcement authority in the statute, Mr. Katz believes that it is a
plausible reading of the OCC's enforcement authority for the
agency to assert that it is justified in enforcing these laws in both
cases. 135 Mr. Katz observes that the FTC Act does not say that it is
unenforceable against banks;
it provides, rather, that it is not
13 6
FTC.
the
by
enforceable
V. BENEFITS AND CONSEQUENCES OF OCC's ABILITY
TO BRING UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE
TRADE PRACTICES ACTIONS

The benefits and repercussions of the OCC's action against
Providian in this case will likely be limited by the fact that
Providian is a unique kind of entity. 13 7 Mr. Katz notes that
Providian occupies a relatively small universe of banks that focus
almost entirely on credit card business and take an extremely
aggressive marketing approach to promote that business.1 3' The
most obvious benefit of the agency's action is increased consumer
protection.139 Banks with credit card programs will be forced to
carefully examine their practices relating to that portion of their
business after seeing the high costs associated with violating unfair
and deceptive trade practice provisions. 40
The Providian
settlement should encourage credit card issuers to consider
carefully the extent and method of disclosure when establishing
marketing procedures. 41
Specifically, issuers should devote
133. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994); Katz interview, supra note 131.
134. Katz interview, supra note 131.
135. Id.

136. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); Katz interview, supra note 131.
137. Katz interview, supra note 131.
138. Id.

139. Meegan interview, supra note 130.
140. Katz interview, supra note 131.
141. Andrew L. Sandier & Molly L. Meegan, Credit Card Issuers Beware:

Consumer Disclosure Issues Present the Next Regulatory and Enforcement Risk For
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special care when formulating a credit insurance program or any
other fee-based product ancillary to the credit card itself,
promotional activities, including balance transfer and no annual
fee programs, cash advance and negotiable check practices, and
account management practices. 4 2 Following the successful
enforcement of the FTC Act, the OCC may now additionally seek
to enforce other federal laws not specifically within the agency's
enforcement jurisdiction, such as an environmental or historic
preservation law. 43
If the OCC's enforcement of the FTC Act remains
unchallenged, other regulatory agencies may also seek to exercise
this power. The same statute that gives the OCC enforcement
authority over national banks' 44 also grants the Federal Reserve
Board and the FDIC the same authority over state member
banks 145 and state nonmember banks, 146 respectively. According to
Mr. Katz, the OCC's theory that it has the authority to enforce
FTC Act provisions is equally applicable to other regulatory
agencies that have cease and desist enforcement authority under §
1818 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 147 Mr. Katz observes
that the OCC is typically more aggressive than either the Federal
Reserve Board or the FDIC in pursuing new regulatory initiatives,
and is not surprised that the OCC was first to attempt direct
enforcement of the FTC Act. 148 He notes, however, that the more
agencies may utilize this enforcement
conservative regulatory
149
future.
the
in
measure
Unintended consequences could result from the extension
of the OCC's power demonstrated in the Providian case as well.
One such consequence could be national banks seeking a different
charter. 50 Karen Shaw Petrou of ISD/Shaw, a consulting firm in
the Industry, 117 BANKING L.J. 329,334 (2000).
142. Id. at 335.
143. Katz interview, supra note 131.

144. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(2)(A) (1994).

145. Id. §57a(f)(2)(B).
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. § 57a(f)(2)(C).
Katz interview, supra note 131.
Id.
Id.
ProvidianNationalBank Settles, supra note 1.
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Washington, D.C., noted that, in the past, national banks have
reacted to significant OCC enforcement by seeking different
charters.15 1 Since national credit card banks such as Providian
depend on federal authority to set uniform nationwide rates, this
52
may not have been an option for credit card banks in the past.
Petrou, however, believes that the OCC's new enforcement stance
is a "pretty heavy price to pay for that kind of benefit.' 53 Mr.
Katz, however, does not believe that aggressive consumer
protection initiatives are likely to cause national banks to switch
charters.' 54 He notes that no regulatory agency will allow another
to provide significantly more consumer protection without taking
steps to match it.155 Neither the Federal Reserve Board nor the
FDIC is likely to allow a bank to by-pass consumer protection
measures by switching bank charters. 56
Another possible consequence could be that banks become
discouraged from issuing as much credit to consumers. 57 Ms.
Meegan notes that the credit card industry is already an extremely
competitive business.'58
If increased consumer protection
initiatives cause the industry to be less lucrative, banks may elect
to issue less credit and pursue profits in other areas. 59
VI. CONCLUSION
The OCC's action in this case represents the first
enforcement of the FTC Act's unfair and deceptive trade practices
provision by a bank regulatory agency.16 In reaching its decision
to pursue this initiative, the OCC likely recognized that it was in a
position to benefit regardless of whether Providian elected to
challenge the agency's action.' 6' If Providian agreed to settle, as it
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2022-23.
Katz interview, supra note 131.
Id.
Id.
Meegan interview, supra note 130.
Id.
Id.
Heller, supra note 11, at 4.
Katz interview, supra note 131.
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did in this case, the OCC successfully enforced the FTC Act
against an offending bank. 62 Conversely, a challenge by Providian
to the OCC's authority to enforce this act would have drawn
attention to the Federal Reserve Board's inaction with respect to
prescribing regulations and added pressure to the Board to
promulgate additional unfair and deceptive trade practice
regulations.163
The long-term effects of the OCC's action in this case may
depend on whether the agency continues to exercise this new
enforcement initiative. The OCC, although successful in this
action against Providian, may take a less aggressive enforcement
stance in President George W. Bush's administration. 164 The new
Republican administration may, therefore, be less likely to pursue
enforcement options such as the one used here against
6
Providianj 1
Aside from the implications of the OCC's action in this
matter, the most intriguing issue with regard to the Providiancase
is whether the agency was acting within its authority when
enforcing the FTC Act. This most controversial question would
have been no issue at all had the Federal Reserve Board
prescribed regulations covering the activities in which Providian
allegedly engaged. 66 The Federal Reserve Board's inaction left
the OCC with the choice of either allowing unfair and deceptive
trade practices beyond the scope of prescribed regulations 167 to
continue or seeking to enforce the FTC Act168 irrespective of the
lack of regulations.
Ultimately, the OCC answered this question through its
action against Providian, relying on the FDIA 169 to provide the
agency the necessary jurisdiction despite contrary language in the

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Meegan interview, supra note 130.

165. Id.
166. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(2)(A) (1994).
167. 12 C.F.R. §§ 227.13-15 (2000). For a discussion of the acts and practices
prohibited by Regulation AA, see supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.

168. 15 U.S.C. § 54(a)(1994).
169. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1994).
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FTC Act itself.17° Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Chevron,
7
still the controlling case on agency statutory interpretation, 1
deference should be given to the OCC's reasonable judgment in
absence of clear congressional intent to the contrary.' The power
of an agency to interpret legislation to enlarge its jurisdiction
caused Robert A. Anthony to question "whether Chevron will
enduringly displace the deep-rooted doctrine than an 'agency may
not finally decide the limit of its statutory power.""" Until the
Supreme Court revisits its decision in Chevron,74 however, the
OCC's action against Providian in this case will remain
permissible.
McNEILL Y. WESTER

170. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 57a(f)(2)(1994).
171. Hornstein interview, supra note 128.
172. Chevron v. National Resources Defense Counsel, 467 U.S. 837,843-44 (1984).
173. Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretation Should Bind Citizens and
the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 54 (1990) (quoting Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327
U.S. 358,369 (1946)).
174. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

